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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. COURT HOLDS USE OF LEASE/PURCHASE AGREEMENTS To FINANCE
BUILDING OF PUBLIC SCHOOL NOT VIOLATIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT
ON LONG TERM DEBT
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Caddell v. Lex-
ington County School District No. 11 legitimized the use of lease/
purchase agreements as an alternative to incurring general obligation
debt.2 Previously, the only method available to government entities to
finance large projects beyond the scope of current revenues was to is-
sue general obligation bonds. The South Carolina Constitution, how-
ever, limits a school district's general obligation debt to 8 percent of
the district's assessed property value, unless the district's electorate
approves the excess.3 Nonetheless, state school boards must provide
children with free public education 4 in suitable schoolhouses,5 without
regard for cost. When voters refuse to approve additional debt, school
boards are caught between conflicting mandates.
Lexington County School District No. 1 faced such a dilemma. En-
rollment exceeded permanent classroom capacity by 33 percent, with
overflow housed in portable classrooms. Furthermore, the parties stipu-
lated that 5 percent per year future growth was anticipated.' Despite
the need for an increase in school capacity,7 the District's voters turned
1. 296 S.C. 397, 373 S.E.2d 598 (1988).
2. Recent opinions issued by the South Carolina Attorney General's office have
concluded that case law existed to support the legality of lease/purchase agreements.
1986 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 265; 1985 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 385. But see, 1971 Op. S.C. Att'y
Gen. 158. Caddell is the first case in which the supreme court has addressed the issue.
3. See S.C. CONST. art. X, § 15 (1875, amended 1977).
4. Id. art. XI, § 3.
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-19-90(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
6. Record at 14.
7. The stipulated facts showed that unless larger permanent facilities were con-
structed, the District would have to spend approximately $800,000 on new portable units
within two years. Portables are more expensive due to higher utility and maintenance
costs and a shorter useful life. Also, it is hard to attract teachers to work in portables
because of poor acoustics. Record at 15-16. The increased student population in port-
ables created serious overcrowding of core facilities such as restrooms, cafeterias, and
libraries. Parents complained that children were not getting access to restrooms during
breaks. Record at 18. One school was forced to serve lunch in eight shifts. Record at 17.
Furthermore, the parties stipulated that renovations were seriously needed to replace
heating, plumbing, and electrical systems worn out from over thirty years of use. Record
at 7. Finally, it was stipulated that unless new and expanded permanent facilities were
1
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down three bond referendums to finance renovations and new
construction. 8
The District's Board of Trustees (Board) planned to acquire the
needed facilities by entering into a lease/purchase agreement, thereby
avoiding the 8 percent debt ceiling.9 The agreement called for the Dis-
trict to execute leases (Base Leases) for land and some existing school
facilities scheduled for improvement, to a private corporation (Corpo-
ration) at one dollar a year.10 The Corporation planned to use its lease-
hold interest in the Base Leases and its leases back to the District
(Project Leases) as collateral. Using the collateral as security, the Cor-
poration would finance the improvements through the sale of certifi-
cates of participation in the Project Leases (Certificates) to investors."
The District would direct all work on the projects. 2 When the con-
struction was complete, the facilities would be leased back to the Dis-
trict under successive one-year leases for an agreed number of years.' 3
The annual rent would be set at the amount required to amortize the
principal and interest owed on the Certificates and the Corporation's
related expenses. 4
The agreement would specifically limit the District's liability. It
would expressly state that the full faith and credit of the District was
not pledged and the Certificates to be issued by the Corporation would
specify the limit of the District's liability. 5 Additionally, the District
never would be obligated to more than one year's rental at any time.
The limitation of liability to one year's rental would be accomplished
by a non-appropriation clause in the lease/purchase agreement. The
non-appropriation clause would allow the District the option, without
penalty, to forego renewing a lease simply by not appropriating the
funds for the year's rental. Should the District exercise this option, the
Corporation would retain the property for the balance of the Base
Lease.16 At the end of a Base Lease period, however, the property with
available within five years, the District would have to adopt extreme measures to serve
the growing enrollment, such as year-round class schedules and eventually dual sessions,
with some children leaving home as early as 5:00 am. and others not returning home
until 9:00 p.m. See Record at 20-21.
8. See Record at 22-A.
9. Caddell, 296 S.C. at 399, 373 S.E.2d at 598.
10. Record at 4. The private corporation would be set up expressly for this purpose
and would operate independently of the Board with separate directors. Record at 22-C.
11. Record at 24.
12. Id. at 27.
13. Id. at 24.
14. Id. at 25.
15. Id. at 28.
16. Id. at 26. The Project Lease periods would be shorter than the Base Lease
periods. See id.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
improvements would revert to the District. If all annual payments were
made, the Base Lease property and improvements would revert to the
District at the end of the Project Lease period.1
To avoid exceeding long term debt limits, many South Carolina
public entities have used various applications of lease/purchase agree-
ments and leases with options to purchase.' 8 The South Carolina Su-
preme Court in Caddell followed the majority rule that lease/purchase
agreements that do not create a future obligation do not result in gen-
eral obligation debt.19 South Carolina's case law also supports the Cad-
dell decision.
20
Maintaining that the agreement would pledge the District's credit
17. Id. at 26.
18. For example, the Swearingen Engineering Center at the University of South
Carolina and the Koger Performing Arts Center, both in Columbia, are financed through
lease/purchase agreements. Similarly, a computer center at Clemson University and a
county office building in Spartanburg are financed through comparable arrangements.
The Item, Dec. 7, 1987, at 2A.
19. Caddell, 296 S.C. at 400, 373 S.E.2d at 599.
Twenty-five states have found various lease agreements do not create long-term
debt. See Opinion of the Justices No. 183, 278 Ala. 298, 178 So. 2d 76 (1965) (non-
appropriation clause lease); Dean v. Kuchel, 35 Cal. 2d 444, 218 P.2d 521 (1950); Gude v.
City of Lakewood, 636 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1981) (non-appropriation clause lease); Corhran v.
Mayor of Middletown, 14 Del. Ch. 295, 125 A. 459 (1924) (non-appropriation clause
lease); State v. Florida Dev. Comm'n, 211 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1968); City of Pocatello v. Peter-
son, 93 Idaho 774, 473 P.2d 644 (1970); Loomis v. Keehn, 400 Ill. 337, 80 N.E.2d 368
(1948) (non-appropriation clause lease); Steup v. Indiana Hous. Fin. Auth., 273 Ind. 72,
402 N.E.2d 1215 (1980) (non-appropriation clause lease); State ex rel. Fatzer v. Kansas
Armory Bd., 174 Kan. 369, 256 P.2d 143 (1953) (non-appropriation clause lease); State
Property & Bldgs. Comm'n v. Hays, 346 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1961) (non-appropriation clause
lease); Edgerly v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 377 A.2d 104 (Me. 1977) (non-appro-
priation clause lease); Eberhart v. Mayor of Baltimore, 291 Md. 92, 433 A.2d 1118 (1981);
Ambrozich v. City of Eveleth, 200 Minn. 473, 274 N.W. 635 (1937); Saint Charles
City-County Library Dist. v. Saint Charles Library Bldg. Corp., 627 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981) (non-appropriation clause lease); Ruge v. State, 201 Neb. 391, 267 N.W.2d
748 (1978) (non-appropriation clause lease); Enourato v. New Jersey Bldg. Auth., 182
N.J. Super. 58, 440 A.2d 42 (App. Div. 1981), affd, 90 N.J. 396, 448 A.2d 449 (1982)
(non-appropriation clause lease); In re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 355 P.2d
1028 (Okla. 1960) (non-appropriation clause lease); Greenhalgh v. Woolworth, 361 Pa.
543, 64 A.2d 659 (1949); Opinion to the Governor, 112 R.I. 151, 308 A.2d 809 (1973);
McFarland v. Barron, 83 S.D. 639, 164 N.W.2d 607 (1969) (non-appropriation clause
lease); Texas Pub. Bldg. Auth. v. Mattox, 686 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1985) (non-appropriation
clause lease); Municipal Bldg. Auth. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985) (non-appropri-
ation clause lease); Baliles v. Mazur, 224 Va. 462, 297 S.E.2d 695 (1982) (non-appropria-
tion clause lease); State ex rel. West Virginia Resource Recovery -Solid Waste Disposal
Auth. v. Gill, 323 S.E.2d 590 (W. Va. 1984); State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 271 Wis.
15, 72 N.W.2d 577 (1955). But see, State ex rel. Nevada Bldg. Auth. v. Hancock, 86 Nev.
310, 468 P.2d 333 (1970); McKinley v. Alamogordo Mun. School Dist. Auth., 81 N.M.
196, 465 P.2d 79 (1969).
20. See supra note 2.
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and therefore violate the constitutional limit on general obligation
debt, Marvin Caddell, a taxpayer in Lexington School District No. 1,
challenged the Board's plan. 21 His complaint set forth six grounds on
which he challenged the legality of lease/purchase agreements. The
trial court resolved all but one in favor of the District.22 Thus, its deci-
sion in favor of Caddell rested on its holding that the agreement
amounted to an implied promise by the District to pay all of the an-
nual rental payments. The trial court held that the agreement consti-
tuted general obligation debt involving a pledge of the District's
credit.
23
On appeal, the District raised all six issues presented in the plain-
tiff's complaint. The supreme court, however, focused on only two is-
sues and alluded to a third.24 The court first addressed the issue of
what constitutes "long term" or "general obligation debt."25 The South
Carolina Constitution defines general obligation debt as "any indebted-
ness of the school district which shall be secured in whole or in part by
a pledge of its full faith, credit and taxing power. '26 Historically, South
Carolina has considered general obligation debt to be "that which is
'ultimately secured by taxes on the property within the political en-
tity.' ,,17 Because a governmental entity is not required to impose prop-
erty taxes for the payment of its yearly expenses or contingent liabili-
ties, neither can be said to be within the meaning of general obligation
21. See Caddell, 296 S.C. at 401, 373 S.E.2d at 599.
22. See Record at 7-10.
23. Record at 7. In reversing the lower court on this point, the supreme court did
not address the practical problem of how the District could freely exercise its non-appro-
priation option when doing so in this situation would result in the loss of its use of
certain utility systems and renovated core facilities in existing schools. A possible solu-
tion to the problem might lie in the fact that presumably the District simply could nego-
tiate yearly leases covering these items.
24. By not addressing the following three issues, the supreme court has left room
for continued uncertainty. First, the circuit court said the alter ego theory does not apply
to the relationship between the Board and the Corporation. It reasoned the Corporation
would "be a separate and distinct legal entity, directed exclusively by its board of direc-
tors pursuant to its articles and bylaws." Record at 7-8. Second, relying on Elliott v.
McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421 (1967), the lower court found that the Corporation's
pledge of the Base Lease would involve no pledge of credit by the District because it
would create no pecuniary liability for the District. Record at 8-9. Third, the lower court
examined the question of illegal delegation of power. It found that the possibility that a
private entity would enjoy public property for a period of time if the District exercised
the non-appropriation clause would not create an illegal delegation of power. Record at
8.
25. Caddell, 296 S.C. at 399-400, 373 S.E.2d at 599.
26. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 15(2) (1875, amended 1977).
27. Caddell, 296 S.C. at 400, 373 S.E.2d at 599 (quoting City of Beaufort v. Griffin,
275 S.C. 603, 605, 274 S.E.2d 301, 303 (1981)).
[Vol. 41
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debt.28
A review of other states' decisions on similar agreements reveals
the significance of the South Carolina court's focus on the nature of
the District's future obligation under the challenged agreement. The
Colorado Supreme Court, focusing on the difference between pledges of
current and future revenues, upheld an agreement it considered in
Gude v. City of Lakewood.2 The Colorado court stated that "discre-
tionary or contingent obligations are not constitutional debt. 'To con-
stitute a debt in the constitutional sense, one legislature, in effect,
must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the
debt created by the first legislature.' "3
Based on the same rationale, the Nevada Supreme Court invali-
dated an agreement in State ex rel. Nevada Building Authority v.
Hancock31 because the agreement pledged payment of all the annual
rentals called for in the contract. Thus, the agreement constituted a
commitment of future revenues. The court rejected the argument that
the contract was merely executory until the consideration for each
year's rental had been furnished.2 The Hancock court's goal was to
further the state's constitutional aim "to limit commitment of future
revenues."33 The court said to hold otherwise would have exalted form
over substance.3' With regard to Caddell, it is significant that the Ne-
vada court distinguished the agreement in Hancock from the one at
issue in Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co.
3 5
In Walla Walla the United States Supreme Court recognized the
concept of the executory contract when no express promise for the fu-
ture appropriation of money has been made. The Court clearly indi-
cated that had the town of Walla Walla created an absolute debt for
the future, the executory contract concept would not have applied. In-
stead, a future obligation would have been created.36 The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court found that the Caddell agreement, with its non-
appropriation clause, did not constitute an express or implied promise
for the future.
3 7
Justice Finney's dissent in Caddell argued that it is not necessary
28. See id.
29. 636 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1981).
30. Id. at 699 (quoting In re Interrogatories, 193 Colo. 298, 305, 566 P.2d 350, 355
(1977)).
31. 86 Nev. 310, 468 P.2d 333 (1970).
32. Id. at 315-16, 468 P.2d at 337.
33. Id. at 316, 468 P.2d at 338.
34. Id.
35. 172 U.S. 1 (1898).
36. Id. at 20.
37. Caddell, 296 S.C. at 400, 373 S.E.2d at 599.
19891
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to invoke the District's taxing power to create general obligation
debt.:8 Instead, Justice Finney stated that the Corporation's use of the
Base Leases as collateral constituted a "pledge of credit" by the
District.39
Relying on Nichols v. South Carolina Research Authority,40 the
majority rejected this argument. In Nichols the court held that the
South Carolina Research Authority may mortgage land deeded to it by
the state to secure debts of private corporations that locate in the Au-
thority's industrial parks. 41 If a corporation was to default on a loan,
the Authority would stand to lose the mortgaged land. Conversely, the
Base Lease property would be lost for only a period of years if the
District exercised its non-appropriation option. The Nichols court
stated that a requirement to raise revenues to meet an obligation is a
pledge of the state's credit.42 The court concluded, however, that the
pledge of "a known, quantifiable asset impos[es] no potential taxpayer
liability, now or in the future. '4 3 Since the Base Lease property was a
"known, quantifiable asset," no potential taxpayer liability existed.
Thus, no pledge of credit was involved.
The Caddell majority's interpretation of Nichols logically equated
general obligation debt to the imposition of future taxpayer liability.
The use or commitment of current revenues to secure needed materials
or services does not constitute general obligation debt.4" Thus, an asset
of the District arguably should be treated like current revenues and
the District should be able to use its assets in the same manner as it is
permitted to use its current revenues.
The court clearly was persuaded by the fact that the agreement's
non-appropriation clause provided the crucial "opt-out" provision that
avoids future taxpayer liability. The clause makes future lease pay-
ments contingent on the Board's optional appropriation of money for
the rental each year. The Supreme Court of Maine, which adheres to
the majority rule espoused in Caddell, has called this a "chicken out"
provision.4'5 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, which also adheres to the
majority rule, declared in State ex rel. Thompson v. Giessel" "that no
state debt is created where payments are to be made solely at the
38. Id. at 404, 373 S.E.2d at 601 (Finney, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
40. 290 S.C. 415, 351 S.E.2d 155 (1986).
41. Id. at 429, 351 S.E.2d at 163.
42. Id. at 419, 351 S.E.2d at 157.
43. Id. at 420, 351 S.E.2d at 158.
44. See, e.g., Carl v. South Carolina Jobs-Economic Dev. Auth., 284 S.C. 438, 327
S.E.2d 331 (1985).
45. See Edgerly v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 377 A.2d 104, 108 (Me. 1977).
46. 271 Wis. 15, 72 N.W.2d 577 (1955).
[Vol. 41
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state's option."""
The South Carolina Supreme Court also focused on the legality of
the District's use of an alternate method of financing to avoid the con-
stitutional limit on long term debt. It relied on the Colorado Supreme
Court's reasoning in Gude v. City of Lakewood,4 8 finding no subterfuge
in the District's plan. The court in Gude found a constitutionally sig-
nificant difference between the creation of general obligation debt,
which requires voter approval, and the construction of a city hail,
which, in and of itself, does not.
49
The South Carolina Supreme Court's approval of lease/purchase
agreements is also supported by Giessel. The Giessel court stated,
"'[I]t must be kept in mind that the purpose of a debt limitation is
not to prevent the municipality from acquiring buildings or public
works, but to place a limitation on the extent to which it may pledge
its credit and hence burden the taxpayers.' ,5 That court also noted
that "'[ilt is never an illegal evasion to accomplish a desired result,
lawful in itself, by discovering a legal way to do it.'"51
Finally, the Caddell court concluded that nothing in the South
Carolina Constitution or South Carolina Code precludes the District's
use of the lease/purchase agreements.52 By so concluding, the court al-
luded to the District's existing authority to lease its property to private
parties as well as to lease property for its own needs.5 3 The court then
stated that the other issues concern public policy and should be left to
the legislature.5
The Caddell decision provides the opportunity for government to
implement better fiscal management, but also poses the potential for
abuse. Ideally, however, freed from constitutional constraints on long-
term debt that limit capital expenditures, state entities will discharge
their duties in the most cost efficient manner possible and temporary
measures will no longer be necessary when long-term solutions that re-
quire financing would be more cost efficient.
47. Id. at 40, 72 N.W.2d at 590.
48. 636 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1981).
49. Id. at 697, cited in Caddell, 296 S.C. at 402, 373 S.E.2d at 600.
50. Giessel, 271 Wis. at 36, 72 N.W.2d at 587-88 (quoting Annotation, Lease of
Property by Municipality or Other Political Subdivision, with Option to Purchase
Same, as Evasion of Constitutional or Statutory Limitation of Indebtedness, 71 A.LR
1318, 1326 (1931) (emphasis omitted)).
51. Id. at 42, 72 N.W.2d at 591 (quoting Tranter v. Allegheny County Auth., 316
Pa. 65, 84, 173 A. 289, 297 (1934)).
52. Caddell, 296 S.C. at 402, 373 S.E.2d at 600.
53. See id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-19-250 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1988)
(listing general powers of school trustees); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-19-250 (Law. Co-op. 1976)
(defining powers of trustees to sale or lease school property).
54. Caddell, 296 S.C. at 402, 373 S.E.2d at 600; see supra note 24.
1989]
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Caddell, however, effectively eliminates the taxpayer's direct veto
power over government excess, a power which has existed since 1895.55
Taxpayer recourse hereafter will be confined to refusing to re-elect offi-
cials authorizing unwarranted expenditures. At best, refusal to re-elect
is remedial. It does not ensure against the perpetuation of excess
spending. Furthermore, in the case of appointed officials, the taxpayer
is left virtually powerless.
Also, it is debatable whether lease/purchase agreements are more
costly than traditional bond issues. Certificates sold in connection with
lease/purchase agreements carry an interest rate .5 percent to .75 per-
cent higher than general obligation bonds. 6 Proponents of the lease/
purchase alternative claim this premium is offset by money saved on
issuing costs required when issuing general obligation bonds, particu-
larly when a bond referendum must be put to a public vote. 7
The question now is how the General Assembly will react to the
Caddell decision. It may take a "wait-and-see" approach, or it may
step in and place limitations on lease/purchase agreements. Indeed, it
is possible the General Assembly could prohibit them all together.
Thus, rather than settling the issue of the legality of lease/purchase
agreements, the South Carolina Supreme Court probably has set the
stage for further study and debate.
Susan A. Fretwell
II. No WARRANT NECESSARY FOR OSHA OFFICIALS TO INSPECT
EMPLOYERS' OSHA-REQUIRED RECORDS
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in McLaughlin v. A.B.
Chance Co.58 unexpectedly determined that an employer has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy with regard to records kept pursuant to
an order by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA)." The court held that an OSHA official, who is lawfully on the
55. See S.C. CONST. art. X, § 5 (1875, amended 1977).
56. Record at 25. If there were a sudden surge in public offerings of Certificates,
the marketplace could demand even higher interest rates. Also, the first time the govern-
ment "chickens out" on a lease/purchase agreement, the impact could be phenomenal.
57. In Caddeil the proposed work was needed, not merely desired. When voters
have turned down a bond referendum on necessary work, the only meaningful cost com-
parison is between temporary measures and those requiring financing. If lease/purchase
agreements are more expensive than bonded indebtedness, however, additional questions
about their propriety may surface if they were used without offering voters the less
costly option.
58. 842 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1988).
59. Id. at 727.
[Vol. 41
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premises responding to an employee's complaint, may require produc-
tion of OSHA forms No. 20060 and No. 10161 without a warrant or an
administrative subpoena.6 2 The court determined that requiring em-
ployers to produce these records was not an unreasonable search under
the fourth amendment.6"
An OSHA official who had received a health and safety complaint
from an employee of A.B. Chance Company went to the plant to in-
spect the facility. The official was permitted to examine the machinery
cited in the complaint, but was denied access to the two requested
forms because he had no search warrant.64 The compliance officer con-
tacted the company a week later and was again denied permission to
examine the documents without a search warrant. The compliance of-
ficer subsequently notified A.B. Chance Company that it had violated
the Occupational Safety and Health Act.65
The Secretary of Labor brought the issue to the attention of the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and an adminis-
trative law judge determined that A.B. Chance Company had violated
the regulation.66 Reversing this decision, the Commission found the
regulation was insufficient to eliminate the warrant requirement.67 The
Fourth Circuit reversed the Commission's finding, apparently deter-
mining the regulation did not permit unreasonable searches.6 "
The Fourth Circuit cited the Supreme Court's decision in See v.
City of Seattle,69 agreeing that generally commercial property owners
have a reasonable expectation of privacy which is protected by the
fourth amendment. 0 The court noted, however, several exceptions to
the warrant rule in certain industries that have been historically highly
regulated.7 1 These cases focus on the lack of a reasonable expectation
60. Form No. 200 is required to be kept by employers under the Code of Federal
Regulations. The form requires a description of all occupational illnesses and injuries
incurred at the facility. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.2(a) (1987).
61. Form No. 101 is required to be kept by employers under the Code of Federal
Regulations. The form requires a supplemental summary of each occupational injury or
illness. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.4 (1987).
62. McLaughlin, 842 F.2d at 726.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 724-25.
65. Id. at 725. The official asserted the company had violated 29 C.F.R. § 1904.7(a),
which mandates the production of documents required under §§ 1904.2(a) and 1904.4
upon the request of any representative of the Secretary of Labor.
66. McLaughlin, 842 F.2d at 725.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 726.
69. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
70. McLaughlin, 842 F.2d at 726.
71. Id. at 726-27 (citing, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (war-
rantless search of a storeroom in a firearms store was held not to violate the fourth
1989]
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of privacy when business employers are on notice that they are operat-
ing in closely regulated industries and often are required to maintain
particular records that are frequently inspected.
7 2
In Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner7 the Seventh Circuit
recognized that administrative searches authorized by specific statutes
may protect adequately the limited privacy expectations of certain
businesses.7 4 The Fourth Circuit, however, adopted the Supreme
Court's analysis requiring a reasonableness test that hinges on balanc-
ing the state's interest in the search against the privacy interest of the
business and the degree of the invasion."
In McLaughlin the court felt the state had a strong interest in
protecting employees from work-related personal injuries.76 The Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act itself was designed for this purpose."
Consequently, the requirement of keeping employment records that
explain work-related injuries was deemed reasonable in furtherance of
the intent of Congress.78 The court also found there could not be any
reasonable expectation of privacy in forms that are required to be kept
and conspicuously posted at the facility.79 Any invasion occasioned by
the search necessarily would be minimal where records are already
made and merely need to.be handed over. 0
The court distinguished this case from Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc.,"1 in which the Supreme Court determined that an OSHA official
amendment); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (warrantless
inspections of liquor dealers held nonviolative of the fourth amendment); Gallaher v.
City of Huntington, 759 F.2d 1155 (4th Cir. 1985) (warrantless search of a precious metal
and gem dealer's premises upheld)).
72. Id. (citing, e~g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (warrant-
less search upheld since under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 certain transactions were
required to be reported, the industry was on notice of the requirement and there was a
strong state interest in the availability of the information); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor dealer held subject to warrantless searches);
Gallaher v. City of Huntington, 759 F.2d 1155 (4th Cir. 1935) (precious metal and gem
dealer operating in a highly regulated industry held subject to reasonable warrantless
searches by regulating authorities); Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 721 F.2d
1072 (7th Cir. 1933) (warrantless search of auto parts dealer upheld as nonviolative
where industry was so highly regulated that dealer was constructively on notice of
inspection)).
73. 721 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1983).
74. See id. at 1078-79.
75. McLaughlin, 842 F.2d at 727 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 727-28.
80. Id.
81. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
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had too much latitude in the scope of his search and held the search
unreasonable.8 2 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that in McLaughlin the
search was narrowly focused on two documents with no risk of the offi-
cial's discretion enlarging the scope of the search to an unreasonable
dimension.83
The Fourth Circuit's holding in McLaughlin is in direct opposition
to rulings in other jurisdictions on similar issues. The most obvious
example is the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Brock v. Emerson Electric
Co.8 4 The court in Brock dealt with identical issues and held that em-
ployers had a protected privacy interest in the same records required
to be kept by OSHA regulations.8 5 Additionally, to obtain these records
OSHA officials were required to produce a subpoena when the search
was nonconsensual.8 6
The Fourth Circuit distinguished Brock on several grounds. It
claimed the Eleventh Circuit failed to analyze adequately the reasona-
bleness of the employer's privacy interest in relation to the balancing
of the state's interest.8 7 The Brock court had reasoned that the com-
pany was not involved in a highly regulated industry merely because
OSHA monitored its employee injuries.88 Therefore, the court deter-
mined the company would expect that it had the privacy interests nor-
mally afforded commercial facilities in a similar position.
The Eleventh Circuit did not discuss specifically the balance of
state interests. In See v. City of Seattle,8 9 however, the Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he agency's particular demand for access will of course
be measured .. .against a flexible standard of reasonableness that
takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the par-
ticular regulation involved." 90 The Eleventh Circuit, which quoted See
in support of its holding, apparently did not feel the public need for
enforcement of the OSHA regulations would be hindered if a warrant
requirement were enforced. See explicitly stated that reasonable in-
spections of documents kept pursuant to regulations is permissible, but
that the inspections must be accomplished through the proper warrant
procedures.9 1
The Sixth Circuit consistently has held that administrative
82. Id. at 323-25.
83. McLaughlin, 842 F.2d at 728.
84. 834 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1987).
85. Id. at 996.
86. Id. at 997.
87. McLaughlin, 842 F.2d at 728.
88. Brock, 834 F.2d at 996.
89. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
90. Id. at 545.
91. Id. at 544.
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searches are not immune to the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment.2 Upon facts nearly identical to those in Brock and Mc-
Laughlin, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that a
recognizable privacy interest in required records may exist. Further-
more, it stated that nonconsensual searches of an employer's business
pursuant to the Act are unreasonable without a warrant.
9 3
An unusual aspect of the case is the fact that the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission consistently has found warrant-
less searches conducted by the Secretary to be violative of the fourth
amendment and the Commission has vacated orders of administrative
law judges who ruled to the contrary.94 The Commission, which was
created to enforce and examine OSHA activities, obviously believes ad-
ministrative searches in non-highly-regulated industries may be made
only pursuant to an appropriate warrant.
The fourth amendment, with its limitations on searches and
seizures, protects privacy interests through a reasonableness stan-
dardY5 Since there has been no argument regarding the necessity for
expediency in the production of the OSHA documents for emergency
or protective purposes, it seems reasonable that officials seeking the
documents be required to obtain a warrant or an administrative sub-
poena. The Secretary of Labor has not argued that time was a factor.
Currently, the circuits are split in diametric opposition. The simplest
solution, and the one that would avoid even potential violations of the
fourth amendment, is to require OSHA officials to obtain a valid war-
rant when the official receives a complaint that will require an investi-
gation necessitating inspection of the employer's records.
Sandra M. Harlen
III. COURT AVOIDS DECISION ON CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATORS'
MEMBERSHIP ON SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
The South Carolina Supreme Court continues to avoid addressing
92. See McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1988) (warrant require-
ment could not be overcome by regulations promoted by OSHA); Allinder v. Ohio, 808
F.2d 1180 (6th Cir.) (Ohio Department of Agriculture not permitted to conduct warrant-
less searches of apiaries), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065 (1987); J.L. Foti Constr. Co. v.
Donovan, 786 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1986) (although OSHA does not require a warrant to
search employer premises, the fourth amendment imposes a constitutional requirement
of a valid warrant pursuant to any such search).
93. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 997.
94. See id. at 990; see also McLaughlin, 842 F.2d 724; Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co.,
834 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1987); Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (11th
Cir. 1982).
95. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
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the constitutionality of four legislators' participation on the South Car-
olina Coastal Council. South Carolina Code section 48-39-40(A) s s
places four members of the General Assembly on the South Carolina
Coastal Council and gives them the power to select six additional
members.9 7 Because the South Carolina Constitution mandates a sepa-
ration of powers among the three branches of government, the compo-
sition of the Council arguably is unconstitutional.98 A 1982 Attorney
General's Opinion concluded that section 48-39-40(A) violates the sep-
aration of powers doctrine."" Nonetheless, in both Energy Research
Foundation v. Waddell'00 and South Carolina Wildlife Federation v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,10 1 the supreme court refused to rule
on this important question.
In 1977 the General Assembly established the Council and gave it
broad regulatory authority over public waters, beaches, wetlands, and
sand dunes.10 2 Under the Act, the Council conducts a broad range of
regulatory programs, including certifications, permitting, inspections,
monitoring, and management of activities affecting coastal resources.
03
Because these powers and duties are typical of executive branch agen-
cies, the Coastal Council has been recognized as such an agency by the
South Carolina Supreme Court. 04
In Waddell six non-profit public interest organizations attempted
to challenge the constitutionality of four legislators' presence on the
96. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-40(A) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
97. See id. Section 48-39-40(A) reads:
There is hereby created the South Carolina Coastal Council which shall consist
of eighteen members as follows: Eight members, one from each coastal zone
county, to be appointed by the local county governing body; six members, one
from each of the congressional districts of the State, to be elected by a major-
ity vote of the members of the House of Representatives and the Senate repre-
senting the counties in such district, each such House or Senate member to
have one vote; and the following legislative members who shall serve ex officio:
Two state Senators, one to be appointed by the President of the Senate and
one to be elected by the Senate Fish, Game and Forestry Committee; and two
members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of
the House. The Council shall elect a chairman, vice-chairman and such other
officers as it deems necessary.
Id.
98. See S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 8. This section reads: "In the government of this State,
the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the government shall be forever separate
and distinct from each other, and no person or persons exercising the functions of one of
said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other." Id.
99. See 1982 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 31.
100. 295 S.C. 100, 367 S.E.2d 419 (1988).
101. 296 S.C. 187, 371 S.E.2d 521 (1988).
102. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-40 to -50 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
103. Id. § 48-39-50.
104. See Guerard v. Whitner, 276 S.C. 521, 280 S.E.2d 539 (1981).
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Coastal Council. These groups sought declaratory and injunctive relief
to bar the four legislators from further participation on the Council.
The legislators moved to dismiss the action for lack of standing. In
response, these groups asserted that their members "use and enjoy the
natural resources of the coastal zone of South Carolina, which are af-
fected by the decisions of the South Carolina Coastal Council."''10 The
court held the groups had no standing to maintain the action since
they had not alleged any individualized injury. 06 The use of the South
Carolina coastal zone was not deemed a personal interest distinct from
that of members of the public.107 Thus, by disposing of the case on
procedural grounds, the supreme court avoided the constitutional
question.
In South Carolina Wildlife Federation similar non-profit public
interest groups also challenged the presence of the four legislators on
the Council. South Carolina Wildlife Federation involved a dispute
over Council certification of a proposed residential development. As an
element of the certification challenge, the Wildlife Federation argued
that the certification must be declared invalid because of the four legis-
lators on the Council. 10 8 While the court found the Federation had
standing to maintain the action, since it alleged individualized injury
resulting from a specific Council decision, it still managed to avoid the
separation of powers question by simply declining to address the issue
after declaring the certification invalid on other grounds.109
The supreme court's refusal to address the separation of powers
question has resulted in conflict of opinion with regard to the constitu-
tionality of the presence of legislators on the Coastal Council. As previ-
ously noted, the Attorney General stated that the presence of the legis-
lators on the Council violates the separation of powers doctrine."0 The
supreme court, however, in Tall Towers, Inc. v. South Carolina Pro-
curement Review Panel,"" indicated that it might be willing to allow
all but the most flagrant incidents of legislative encroachment. The
court stated that overlap of authority and legislative encroachment
would be tolerated in complex areas of government to a limited degree
in order to increase cooperation between the legislative and executive
branches." 2
105. Waddell, 295 S.C. at 102, 367 S.E.2d at 420.
106. Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)).
107. Id.
108. See Brief of Appellant at 38-45, South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n, 296 S.C. 187,
371 S.E.2d 521.
109. See South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n, 296 S.C. at 190, 371 S.E.2d at 523.
110. See supra note 99.
111. 294 S.C. 225, 363 S.E.2d 683 (1987).
112. Id. at 230, 363 S.E.2d at 685.
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Controversy has developed recently over the Council's implemen-
tation of newly enacted legislation and other environmental issues."'
By its refusal to address the important separation of powers question,
the supreme court unnecessarily contributes to the controversy over
Council authority by leaving open the possibility that Coastal Council
action could be subject to constitutional challenge by parties with
standing. The supreme court should address the constitutionality of
Council membership and resolve the question of Coastal Council au-
thority to act.
James Mauldin Gibson
113. See Lawsuits Challenge Beach Law, The State, Oct. 30, 1988, at 1-D, col. 5.
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